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CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF CORPORA-

TION DIRECrORS.-[New York] Bernard K. Marcus and Saul Singer
were charged with violation of N.
Y. Penal Law sec. 305, for abstracting and misapplying funds of the
Municipal Safe Deposit Company of
which they were directors. Both
defendants were also directors and
officers (Marcus president and Singer vice president) of the Bank of
United States which owned the stock
of the safe deposit company. The
Bank of United States had loaned
to its affiliates (The Bankus, City
Financial, and Municipal Financial
Corporations) $12,000,000, or $8,000,000 too much under the Banking Law limiting loans to ten per
cent of its capital stock. As directors and principal officers defendants also controlled and dominated
these financial corporations. To reduce these excessive loans, the following scheme was pursued. The
three safe deposit companies (defendants were directors of three all
told) borrowed $8,000,000 from the
Bank of United States and with this
bought real estate equities of $4,800,000 from the financial corporations (these real estate equities having been valued at $8,000,000 by
Saul Singer on a rapidly falling
market). With the money paid to
them for the real estate equities,
the financial corporations reduced
their indebtedness to the Bank of

United States by $8,000,000 by the
use of the bank's own inoney. The
purchase of these equities by tric
deposit companies was not made directly, but by means of two dummy
or "desk drawer corporations"-the
Premier Development Corporation
and the Bolivar Development Corporation. Defendants were found
guilty. Held: on appeal, affirmed:
People v. Marcus (1933) 261 N. Y.
268, 185 N. E. 97.
The defendants were convicted
tinder a section of the New York
penal law which makes it a felony
for any officer, director, employee
or agent of any corporation to which
the banking law is applicable wilfully to misapply its credit: N. Y.
Consolidated Laws (Cahill 1930)
ch. 41 (Penal Law), sec. 305. Under this and a similar statute in
Massachusetts (Mass. Cum. Statutes (1927) ch. 266, sec. 53a) intent to defraud is not made an essential element of the crime as contrasted with a similar but more
limited law enacted by Congress for
national banks: 12 U. S. C. A. sec.
592.
The court in applying this penal
statute to the instant case proceeded
on the theory that if the defendants
knowingly used the assets of the
deposit companies "for other than
corporate purposes of proper and
legitimate investment," even though
they had no intention of cheating
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or defrauding the companies, the

statute had been violated. In other
words Marcus and Singer subjected
themselves to criminal liability by
wilfully abstracting funds from the
Municipal Safe Deposit Company,
the actual abstracting being the
loaning of money on questionable
and over-rated real estate and the
use of this money for purposes not
those of the deposit companies.
The dissent pointed out that
though the defendants may have
been guilty of criminal negligence
as to the Bank of United States,
still they were not charged with
such wrong. It was also pointed
out that due to the inter-connection
of the various companies, the defendants thought this plan would
prevent disaster to the whole chain
of banking institutions. Marcus
and Singer claimed that they "acted
in honest reliance upon the advice
of counsel that such use of the
moneys of the safe deposit company
was a proper and legitimate use of
its corporate funds." Thus, though
this use may have been improper,
they can hardly be accused of knowingly misapplying these funds and
to sustain conviction under section
305 the People must prove this
knowledge.
Since the statute requires a willful misapplication, the question is
raised in view of this advice of
counsel and the close interlinking
of the various companies, whether
the misapplication was willful. The
dissent considered intent important
in this connection and raised the
question of the majority court's
omission of intent from their interpretation of the statute.
It is interesting at this point to
look to the more limited but similar
federal law. Under this law two
factors must be proved-the willful
misapplication and the intent to in-

jure or defraud: Robinson v. U.
S. (C. C. A. 6th, 1929) 30 F. (2d)
25; 12 U. S. C. A. sec. 592. Nevertheless, the various interpretations
of intent and misapplication under
this statute do differ. Some courts
hold advice of counsel as material,
Bishop v. U. S. (C. C. A. 8th, 1926)
16 F. (2d) 410; or that the essence
of the criminal misapplication is a
conversion of the funds of the corporation to the defendant's or
others' use, Cooper v. U. S. (C. C.
A. 4th, 1926) 13 F. (2d) 16, U. S.
v. Britton, 107 U. S. 655, 2 S. Ct.
512; or that there is a misapplication even though made in the hope
that the bank's or corporation's welfare would be ultimately promoted
if the necessary effect is or may be
to injure or defraud the bank, U.
S. v. Breese, (D. C. N. C. 1906)
131 Fed. 922, and intent may even
be presumed from such disastrous
effects: Walsh v. U. S. (D. C. Ill.
1909) 174 Fed. 615. In a very
recent case, the federal court went
so far as to say that "intent to defraud may be present even though
pecuniary injury to the bank is not
intended and doesn't occur": Robinson v. U. S., supra (intent to deceive higher officers of the bank
concerning certain fictitious transactions constituted "intent to defraud").
These decisions justify
the conclusion that under the federal law, with policy and purpose
much the same as the New York
statute, the instant case might reach
a far different result.
In view of the violations of the
banking law in connection with the
Bank of United States, such as the
excessive loans to the subsidiary
corporations, the "desk drawer corporations" and the questionable
value of the securities passed off
on the safe deposit cimpanies, the
conclusion seems justifiable that the

RECENT CRIMINAL CASES
defendants well merited their sentence-this in spite of the significant
but liberal dissent. However, in
spite of the strict construction of
this penal statute the question remains-is a decision like that of the
instant case a sufficient prophylactic? When corporate directors will
gamble with the life earnings of
thousands on falling markets, or
speculate with such funds with the
conviction that the economic equilibrium can never be disturbed, it
would seem that there are two constructive courses open, on the basis
of public policy and considering the
many interests involved.
There
should be either a stricter governmental supervision over corporate
affairs, especially in the case of
banks, or a more drastic application
of the penal statutes now applicable.
In the latter a revision of some with
longer sentences might be very effective in impressing on directors
the duties of trust and loyalty due
a corporation and its stockholders.
FRANcIs ROBERT FITZSIIMONS.

CRIMINAL LAW CESSITY

OF

ROBBERY -

FELONIOUS

NE-

INTENT.-

[Mississippi] Defendant was convicted of the crime of robbing the
prosecuting witness of a cow and a
yearling calf. The defendant's dog
had the habit of sucking eggs, and
for a period of about two months
prior to the alleged robbery, this
dog had been making nightly raids
on the witness' hen yard. Although
repeatedly driven away, the dog returned and wandered near the witness' home where it was killed. On
the following morning the defendant, armed with a shotgun, went
with his two sons into a field where
the witness was at work and accused the latter of killing the dog,
which act was readily admitted.

The witness was ordered to throw
up his hands and the defendant
thereupon had his sons search him,
demanding that he either be paid
twenty dollars or turn over a cow
and yearling in payment for the loss
of the dog. Being unable to pay
the twenty dollars and fearing death
or bodily injury, a cow and yearling
were relinquished and driven away.
A statement was made by the defendant that the property could be
redeemed by the payment of twenty
dollars. Held: on appeal, affirmed.
The collection of an unliquidated
claim for damages by force and
violence is robbery:
Thomas v.
State (Miss. 1933) 148 So. 225.
However ludicrous the factual
situation, this case serves to raise
some fine distinctions between the
crimes of robbery and larceny. Although robbery has been distinguished from assault, larceny, theft,
and forcible trespass, still in a generic sense larceny and robbery are
but different degrees of the same
crime: Montsdoca v. State (1922)
84 Fla. 82, 93 So. 157, Note 27 A.
L. R. 1291. At common law robbery has been defined as the felonious taking of goods or money
from the person or presence of another by means of force or intimidation: Deal v. United States (1927)
274 U. S. 277, 47 S. Ct. 613; People v. Covelesky (1921) 217 Mich.
90, 185 N. W. 770; O'Donnell v.
People (1906) 224 Ill. 218, 79 N.
E. 639; Langford v. Commonwealth
(1925) 209 Ky. 693, 273 S. W. 492;
Long v. State (1852) 12 Ga. 293.
The robbery statutes of most of the
states are merely reassertions of
this common law definition: People v. Shuler (1865) 28 Cal. 490,
492; State v. Gorham (1875) 55 N.
H. 152, 166. Robbery under these
definitions is obviously a mere aggravated form of larceny, the ag-
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gravation consisting of the use of
actual or constructive violence
against the person of the victim:
Butts v. Commonwealth (1926) 145
Va. 800, 133 S. E. 764; Montsdoca
v. State, supra. In other words,
robbery may be defined as a forcible
larceny from the person: People
v. Clary (1887) 72 Cal. 59, 13 Pac.
77; State v. Wasson (1905) 126
Iowa 320, 101 N. W. 1125; Commonwealth v. Clifford (1851)
8
Cush. (62 Mass.) 215. Still, it is
a distinct crime, for there can be
no robbery without violence and no
larceny, including that from the
person, with it: Montsdoca v. State,
supra. A further distinction is
found, however in the fact that larceny may or may not include a taking from the person or presence,
whereas the crime of robbery must
include such a taking: Armstrong
v. Commonwealth (1921) 190 Ky.
217, 227 S. W. 162. Secrecy, therefore, cannot be an element in the
crime of robbery: State v. Powell
(1889) 103 N. C. 424, 9 S. E. 627.
It thus becomes evident that while
robbery is, like larceny an offense
against property in that there must
be an intent to appropriate the property permanently, it is also, and primarily, an offense against the person, with the result that any forcible
taking of personal property from
the possession of a person is robbery. Such a taking will be so considered even if the force employed
is not actual, but is effective to put
the victim in fear, and the property
is taken from his mere custodianship: People v. Carpenter (1924)
315 Ill. 87, 145 N. E. 664; Bowen v.
State (1915) 16 Ga. App. 110, 84
S. E. 730; Langford v. Commonweealth, supra; Montsdoca v. State,
supra.
The instant case did not concern
the more obvious distinctions sug-
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gested above, but raised the question of whether or not felonious
intent is a necessary element of the
crime of robbery. The rule has
been constantly reiterated that no
matter how vicious the taking, still
the crime of robbery will not have
been committed in the absence of
a felonious intention to deprive the
victim of his property permanently:
Kennedy v. State (1922) 208 Ala.
66, 93 So. 822; Butts v. Commonwealth, supra. The absence of such
intent has resulted in acquittal:
People v. McKeighan (1919) 205
Mich. 367, 171 N. W. 500; State v.
Morris (1924) 96 W. Va. 291, 122
S. E. 914 (in the course of an
arrest); In re Lewis (1897) 83 Fed.
159 (in pursuance of a warrant even
though it be insufficient); Southerland v. Commonwealth (1926) 217
Ky. 94, 288 S. W. 1051 (as a matter
of self-protection) ; Johnson v. State
(1923) 24 Okla. Crim. 326, 218 Pac.
179 (by mistake)-; Commonwealth v.
White (1890) 133 Pa. 182, 19 Atl.
350 (as a joke). As a further extension of this rule, it has been held
Iby the majority that it is not robbery to take property under a bona
fide claim of right or title: State
v. Culpepper (1921) 293 Mo. 249,
238 S. W. 801; State v. Wasson,
supra; People v. Sheasbey (1927)
82 Cal. App. 459, 255 Pac. 836 (specific property); People v. Hall
(1865) 6 Parker Crim. (N. Y.) 642
(property taken as security); State
v. Steele (1929) 150 Wash. 466, 273
Pac. 742 (money recovered from
an alleged thief). This rule has
also been employed to free from a
charge of robbery persons who have
by force or intimidation proceeded
to the collection of a debt honestly
believed due: State v. Halloway
(1875) 41 Iowa 200; State v. Culpepper, supra; Butts v. Commonwealth, supra. But cf. Common-
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wealth v. Stebbins (1857) 8 Gray
(74 Mass.) 492 (grabbing and retaining bank notes from a table in
payment of a note long over due
held larceny).
Apparently, then,
the element of force or intimidation
is not a substitute for the intent to
steal: People v. Sheasbey, 'supra.
But under circumstances similar to
the unusual situation found in the
instant case it has been held by the
two courts previously to consider
the problem, that the rule should
not be extended to protect from a
charge of robbery one who by force
or intimidation collected unliquidated
damages: Fannin v. State (1907)
51 Tex. Crim. 41, 100 S. W. 916,
Note 10 L. R. A. (N. s.) 744; Tipton
v. State (1923) 23 Okla. Crim. 86,
212 Pac. 612, Note 31 A. L. R. 1074.
Cf. People v. Smith (1863) 5 Parker Crim. (N. Y.) 490. In support
of this rule the defendant in the
principal case was found guilty of
robbery despite the fact that it was
acknowledged by the court that he
had no felonious intent. The reason for refusing to extend the rule
of the Culpepper case, supra, was
admittedly due to the fact that the
prosecuting witness' civil liability
was questionable and in any event
he would only have been liable for
unliquidated damages.
Thus in the light of the majority
rule that the element of force or intimidation is not a substitute for
the intent to steal, the Fannin and
Tipton, as well as the instant case,
would appear to be contrary to the
common law as well as the statutory doctrines of robbery, with the
possible exception of some suggestions contained in certain obiter
dicta of Justice Clerke in the Smith
case, supra. Although it would
seem necessary in the light of pure
logic, or the doctrine of stare decisis to adhere to the majority rule,
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nevertheless, ib is quite apparent
that there was in these cases, such
unreasonable conduct on the part of
the defendant in view of questionable liability of the victim that the
courts might be justified in meting
out the severe punishment accompanying a conviction for robbery.
The policy of the law has never
been to give any man the right to
self-redress except in instances of
self-defense, recaption and reprisals,
entry on lands, and the abatement
of nuisances. In the only two instances of self-redress which relate
to the repossession of property, the
law limits the right to cases where
it can be exercised without force
or terror or any breach of the peace.
Further to allow such conduct to
pass unmolested is, in effect, to take
from a debtor his rights, whereas
he may, as in the instant case, have
a defense to the claim the sufficiency of which can be properly determined only by tribunals appointed
by the law. Even from the standpoint of the logic which requires
intent to constitute the crime of
robbery, it would also be unjust to
allow an alleged creditor to recover
his demand without requiring him
to prove it, where it is, or may be,
disputed. To allow such a practice
will deprive more debtors of their
rights than cause injuries to creditors. Would, for instance, the law allow a man to take money furtively
out of the desk of his alleged debtor
and apply it to the payment of his
debt? He has, in effect, the opportunity of doing this under the
majority rule, where he is excused
when his object is to get that which
he honestly believes his due. It is
submitted, however, that his lack of
felonious intent would be as positive as in the present case. The
only difference would be that in
the one case he obtained the money
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by means which the law, in most
cases, calls justifiable collection of
a debt, while in the case supposed,
he would have obtained it by means
which the law, in ordinary cases,
calls larceny, and no doubt he would
be convicted of larceny in the supposed case.
ROBERT T. WRIGHT.

VENUE

IN

CONSPIRACY

CASES.-

[Illinois] The appellant was convicted in the criminal court of Cook
County of conspiracy to obtain
money by false pretenses. It was
admitted that he entered into the
conspiracy in St. Louis, Mo., and
later met with another conspirator
in Springfield, Ill., to do the acts
mentioned in the indictment. A coconspirator, Blaine, consummated
the crime in Cook County. The appellant admitted encouraging, aiding
and abetting the activities of Blaine
in Cook County, but argued that he
was only an accessory who was not
present, and therefore not subject
to the jurisdiction of a court of
Cook County. He relied on sec. 4
of div. 10 of the criminal code, Ill.
Rev. Stat. (Smith-Hurd 1931) ch.
38, sec. 703; "The local jurisdiction of all offenses, not otherwise
provided by law, shall be in the
county where the offense was committed." He contended that since
the conspiracy was committed in one
county and the overt act was committed by Blaine in another (Cook)
the charge of conspiracy cannot be
legally laid in Cook County against
him as one of the conspirators as
he was not in Cook County in furtherance of the conspiracy, and therefore the proof failed to support the
indictment that two or more persons
committed the crime of conspiracy
in Cook County. Held: the overt
act of one of the co-conspirators in
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Cook County gave the court jurisdiction over all the conspirators,
even though they had not appeared
in that county in furtherance of the
conspiracy: People v. Miller (1933)
352 Ill. 537, 186 N. E. 180.
The crime of conspiracy is generally considered to be founded upon an unlawful agreement, and no
act in furtherance of the unlawful
design is necessary to complete the
offense: People v. Drury (1929)
335 Ill. 539, 167 N. E. 823; People
v. Glassberg (1917) 326 Ill. 379,
158 N. E. 103; People v. Bluinenberg (1915) 271 Ill. 180, 110 N. E.
788. Logically, then, the county
where the conspiracy was formed
would have jurisdiction. But since
conspiracy is in the nature of a continuous offense, any act of furtherance of the unlawful design is a renewal of the offense: People v.
Drury (1929) 335 Ill. 539, 167 N.
E. 823, and venue may be laid as
to arzy or all conspirators in the
county in which the overt act was
done by any of them: 2 Wharton,
Criminal Procedure (12th ed. 1922)
sec. 1666. Thus a double jurisdiction arises in which a venue of conspiracy may be properly laid in
either the county where the unlawful agreement was made or in the
county where the overt act was
done: Yenckichi v. U. S. (C. C. A.
9th, 1933) 64 F. (2d) 73; Commonwealth v. Barnes (1932) 107 Pa.
46, 162 Atl. 670; Commonwealth v.
Saul (1927) 260 Mass. 97, 156 N. E.
679. In cases where the overt act
was done in a foreign country the
district court where the conspiracy
was proved had jurisdiction: Horwilz et al. v. United States (C. C.
A. 5th, 1932) 63 F. (2d) 706.
Where the conspiracy was committed in a foreign country, the district court where the overt act was
proved had jurisdiction: United
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States v. Ford (1927) 273 U. S. 593,
47 S. Ct. 531. The rule allowing
double jurisdiction is a practical
one inasmuch as it is often impossible for a grand jury to find just
where the conspiracy was formed.
Its constitutionality has been settled in Hyde v. U. S. (1912) 225
U. S. 347, 32 S. Ct. 793; Armour
Packing Co. v. U. S. (1908) 209
U. S. 56, 28 S. Ct. 474, where it
has been said that where a continuing offense is committed in more
than one district, the Sixth Amendment does not preclude a trial in
any one of those districts. The constitutional requirement is that the
crime shall be tried in the state or
district where the party committing
it happened to be at the time. This
distinction is brought out in the case
of In Re Palliser (1890) 136 U. S.
257, 265, 10 S. Ct. 1034, and reaffirmed in the Hyde case.
Another question arises when the
conspirator is tried in the county
where the overt act was done, but
where this particular conspirator
had never been physically present in
furtherance of the conspiracy. Can
he be deemed present even though
it was actually his co-conspirator
who had done the act? In conspiracy at common law, each conspirator was responsible in any
place where any overt act by one
of his co-conspirators was done:
Ex parte Rogers (1881) 10 Tex. Cr.
App. 655; Commonwealth v. White
(1877) 123 Mass. 430. In the Federal courts it has generally been
held that he would be constructively
present by virtue of the act of his
co-conspirator: Easterday V. McCarthy (C. C. A. 2nd, 1919) 256
Fed. 651; Hyde v. U. S., supra. In
the Hyde case the majority held
that there may be a constructive
presence distinct from a personal
presence by which a crime may be
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consummated, and an overt act of
one is the act of all. Although four
justices dissented, led by Holmes,
the majority holding has been followed: Burns v. U. S. (C. C. A.
8th, 1922) 279 Fed. 986; Morris v.
U. S. (C. C. A. 8th, 1925) 7 F.
(2d) 789; Easterday v. McCarthy
(C. C. A. 2d, 1919) 256 Fed. 651.
By a federal statute (U. S. C. tit.
18, sec. 88) an overt act is necessary to complete the federal offense
of conspiracy, whereas most states
follow the common law in holding
that the unlawful agreement in itself completes the offense. The distinction does not, however, affect
the holdings on venue of conspiracy
cases, because, as has been pointed
out, venue may lie in either the district where the conspiracy was committed or where the overt act was
done.
Mr. Justice Holmes in his dissenting opinion in the Hyde case,
pointed out serious objections to the
use of the fiction of constructive
presence to draw jurisdiction to the
place of the overt act. Although
by federal statute the overt act is
necessary to complete the offense, it
is in fact no part of the conspiracy:
Hyde v. Shine (1905) 199 U. S. 62,
76, 25 S. Ct. 760. Thus, reasons
Mr. Justice Holmes, it should not
be said that an act constituting no
part of the crime charged, draws
jurisdiction to the place where it is
done. If the conspiracy is present
wherever an overt act is done, it
may be at the choice of the government to prosecute in any one of
many states, in none of which the
conspirators have been. This is a
the
conspirators,
'hardship on
amounting to a grievous wrong.
But in view of the present day need
for every effective weapon to combat organized crime, the use of
double jurisdiction in conspiracy
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cases, is not to be severely condemned. In the hands of the prosecuting attorneys conspiracy charges
have been very effectively used as
a "catch-all" device for every type
of crime. Everybody from corrupt
bank officials to labor disturbers are
being brought to justice by the use
of this drag-net offense. To restrict
its use would be to hinder greatly
the administration of criminal law.
In practice, prosecution of conspirators is greatly facilitated by
allowing it to take place in either
the jurisdiction of the crime or of
the overt act. It may be true that
it is a hardship on the conspirators
to be subject to the jurisdiction of
as many states as there were overt
acts committed, but to hold otherwise would be to say that once the
place of conspiracy is concealed, as
it may be, they may execute their
crime in every state in the Union
and defeat punishment in all. Rather
should the conspirators be taken
from their homes than the victims
and witnesses of the conspiracy be
taken from theirs.
Theoretically, a conspirator may
be convicted in a state court for his
overt act, and after serving his sentence, may in turn be convicted of
the same offense in each and every
other state where other acts were
committed, as well as in the state
where the conspiracy was originally
formed. In no state could he plead
a former conviction in another state
in bar of his prosecution, because
the overt act in each state constitutes a new offense in the eyes
of the state where it was committed.
Thus be might be convicted for the
same offense in fact, in twenty states
and serve sentences in all. A state
court may take cognizance of a
former conviction in another state
for actually the same offense, but
in the absence of statute there is

nothing to compel this to be done.
As a matter of practice, it is doubtful whether a prosecuting attorney,
knowing the conspirator had previously served a prison term in another state for the same offense,
would prosecute. Yet there is nothing to stop him, and this fact makes
it a serious consideration whether
Mr. Justice Holmes and the minority
might not be right in their belief
that jurisdiction should not follow
the overt act.
STANLEY

DOUBLE

A.

JEOPARDY. -

TWEEDLE.

[Pennsyl-

vania]
The defendant Simpson
was tried on an indictment charging murder in the first degree. The
jury had been sworn, and without
the accused's acquiescence, or any
apparent cause, the jury was discharged on the motion of the state.
Later Simpson was charged with
murder in the second degree and
voluntary manslaughter upon the
original indictment stating (verbatim) the same set of facts. The
defendant entered a plea of former
jeopardy, and the prosecution demurred. The lower court overruled
the demurrer from which an appeal
was taken. By virtue of the fact
that the appeal involved purely a
question of law the .state had the
right of appeal. Held: on appeal,
reversed. Where the jury is discharged in a capital case before
rendering a verdict, the state may
subsequently try the defendant on
the same indictment for a degree
of homicide less than murder in the
first degree:
Commonwealth v.
Simpson (1933) 310 Pa. 380, 165
Atl. 498.
The question that confronted the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
was whether or not the defendant
may be tried again upon the same
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indictment charging murder, when
the state strives not for a conviction for murder in the first degree,
but for murder in the second degree or manslaughter. The majority conceded that Simpson could not
be reindicted on the same set of
facts for first degree murder, as he
then would again be in jeopardy of
life:
Hilands v. Commonwealth
(1885) 111 Pa. 1, 2 Atl. 70. Pennsylvania has given the double jeopardy provision of the constitution
of that state a singular construction, holding that this provision
shall apply only to capital punishCommonwealth v.
ment cases:
Cook (1821) 6 Serg. & R. 577;
McCreary v. Commonwealth (1857)
29 Pa. 323. Although the Pennsylvania provision is not unlike that
of the Federal Constitution: "No
person shall, for the same offense
be twice put in jeopardy of life
or limb," Pennsylvania Constitution
Art. I, Sec. 10, the courts of that
state have held that language of
this provision must be plainly and
strictly construed. Under the Pennsylvania Criminal Code the only
capital case is that of murder in the
first degree, hence the former jeopardy plea applies only to this one
offense wherein under present law,
life or limb is placed in jeopardy,
and as was suggested in the present
case, "if at some future time the
punishment for murder should be
made life imprisonment in all cases,
the clause in question would be of
no service." The United States Supreme Court in construing the
double jeopardy provision of the
Federal Constitution has extended
the protection of this clause to all
criminal offenses: Ex Parte Lange
(1874) 18 Wall. 163; Berkowitz v.
United States (C. C. A. 3d. 1899)
93 Fed. 452; Murphy v. United
States (C. C. A. 7th 1923) 285 Fed.
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801. The majority of the states are
in accord with the Federal view:
City of St. Paul v. Stamn (1908)
106 Minn. 81, 118 N. W. 154; Brink
v. State (1885) 18 Tex. Cr. App.
344; Hazelton v. State (1915) 13
Ala. 243, 68 So. 715; People v.
Miner (1893) 144 Ill. 308, 33 N. E.
40. "The plea of once in jeopardy
on a statutory bar applies to all
misdemeanors as well as felonies":
Ex parte Harron (1923) 191 Cal.
457, 217 Pac. 728. Following the
rationale of its precedents the court
in the instant case utilized this construction to modernize criminal law
procedure. It openly declared that
the law must throw off unnecessary
steps in order to keep apace with
organized crime, reasoning that on
a trial for first degree murder, the
jury being discharged before verdict, the defendant should not be
set scot free, for his offense which,
as the proofs showed rose no higher
than manslaughter; whereas if the
indictment in the first instance had
been drawn for manslaughter, the
court could have achieved a successful conviction.
A vigorous and sharp dissent was
directed against the majority. The
minority, even though cognizant of
the construction of the jeopardy
provision, objected strongly to its
application to this particular case,
holding, "Heretofore this court has
uniformly held that when a defendant is called to answer an indictment charging murder, and the jury
is sworn, and then, before verdict is
rendered, the jury is, without the
defendant's consent and without absolute necessity, discharged, the defendant cannot again be tried on
the same indictment if he has interposed the plea of former jeopardy." A person having been acquitted on an indictment, it is not
permissible to use this same indict-
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ment, with the same facts, to reindict him again: Hilands v. Comvionwealth (1885) 111 Pa. 1, 2 Atl.
70. In Commonwealth v. Fitzpatrick
(1886) 121 Pa. 109, 15 Atl. 466,
where the jury had been discharged
for failing to agree, the court held
that this was a bar to a subsequent
trial on the same indictment.
The majority opinion does not
clearly define its reasoning, and it
can be said that other jurisdictions
will not follow the principle of
allowing the discarded indictment to
be used on a subsequent charge.
"Where a person is prosecuted for
an offense and acquitted generally,
* * * I he shall not again be prosecuted for any offense, based on the
same act, of which he could have
been convicted on the first prosecution." Preliminary Draft Number
2; Model Code of Criminal Procedure (Double Jeopardy) Sec. 8. In
section 10 of this code it is said,
"Where proof of the same facts
would be sufficient to convict a person of either of two offenses, an
acquittal or conviction of such person of one of such offenses is a
bar to a prosecution of such person
for the other of such offenses based
on the same facts." Likewise in
the case of State v. Messervery
(1916) 105 S. C. 254, 89 S. E. 662,
two indictments charging the same
offense were drawn against the accused by different counties. The
defendant asked that he be protected against the indictment of
county B, as he was on trial on
indictment by county A. The court
said, "If he wanted protection from
the indictment in Colleton county
(B) he now has it, in former jeopardy." A review of the decisions
throughout the United States shows
a general affirmance of the statement of the Model Code of Criminal Procedure, Sec. 8, supra: Peo-
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ple v. Dugas (1923) 141 N. E. 769,
310 Ill. 291; Commonwealth v. Weston (1922) 241 Mass. 131, 135 N.
E. 465. No decisions can be found
in accord with the majority opinion of the preseit case.
On the question of whether or
not the discharge of a jury for
disagreement, without the accused's
consent, shall be a bar to a subsequent trial for the same offense,
the majority of the states and the
Federal Courts are not in harmony
with the Pennsylvania holding.
In Commonwealth v. Fitzpatrick
(1886) 121 Pa. 109, 15 AUt. 466,
the court held that in consideration
of the fact that the jury had been
out for five days and was discharged, such an action constituted
a bar to a subsequent trial for the
same offense. Accord: State v.
Nelson (1896) 19 R. I. 467, 33 L.
R. A. 559. The Federal Courts
hold that such a discharge of a
jury shall not be a bar: United
States v. Perez (1824) 22 U. S. 9.
Accord: Dobbins v. State (1863)
14 Ohio St. 493; Commonwealth v.
Bowden (1813) 9 Mass. 494; Dreyer
v. People -(1900) 188 Ill. 40, 58 N.
E. 687.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania was faced with a difficult decision. Its bench was cognizant of
the dilatory and unnecessary complexities of criminal law procedure.
In its zeal for reform it felt, "...
our present construction comports
more with sound public policy and
with the necessity, now existing in
dealing with lawbreakers, for a
reasonable interpretation of a criminal law." However, it is very
doubtful whether the other states
will follow the precedent set by
Pennsylvania. By virtue of the fact
that other jurisdictions have not
followed the Pennsylvania construction of the double jeopardy provi-
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sion, it seems rather obvious that
this even more restricted application
of that provision will be championed

truthfulness, as between each other,
in their dishonest practices," citing an old New York case to that
by Pennsylvania alone.
effect: McCord v. People (1848)
HAROLD J. HODGSON.
46 N. Y. 470. But the court denied
the contention on the ground that
the acts and conduct of the proseCONFIDENCE GAME- CONDUCT OF cuting witness can never bar the
PROSECUTING WITNESS AS A DEstate from the prosecution of a
FENSE. - [California]
Defendant
criminal: People v. Martin (1894)
Lewis ingratiated himself into the 102 Cal. 558, 36 Pac. 952.
company of one Stine. In a hotel
The rule in the McCord case has
in Oakland defendant Hall ap- often been adverted to under cirpeared, and was introduced to Stine cumstances similar to those in the
by Lewis as a betting commissioner
instant case, and has been strongly
for a wealthy man, and the pos- criticised. It has been pointed out,
sessor of a method by which he in People v. Tompkins (1906) 186
secured infallible tips before eachi N. Y. 413, 79 N. E. 326, that the
race. Lewis, using Hall's ticket to rule was based upon an earlier case
a fictitious "exchange," and his wherein the assumption was entergratuitous advice on the horses, re- tained that the New York law rested
turned several times with sums of upon and was limited to the condimoney which purported to be his tions recited in Stat. 30 Geo. II,
winnings. Finally Hall gave him chap. 24-that the law is "designed
a faked credit slip for $50,000 and to reach the evil-disposed persons
Lewis reported, after a time, that whose stratagems . . . have enabled
he had won $153,000, but would them to obtain money to the great
have to produce $50,000 in cash be- injury of industrious families and
fore collecting the winnings, in or- to the manifest injury of trade and
der to demonstrate that he could credit": People v. Stetson (1848)
have honored the wager in the everit 4 Barbour's Reports 151.
he had lost. Stine agreed to conThis rather righteous limitation
tribute $10,000 into a pool of $50.000 on the law of false pretences has
to gain a share of the winnings. also been entertained in Wisconsin
Later he grew suspicious, and in- in State v. Crowley (1876) 41 Wis.
formed the police. The defendants 271, and was adopted as recently as
were convicted of attempt to com1915 in Oregon: State v. Alexmit grand theft and conspiracy to ander (1915) 76 Ore. 329, 148 Pac.
commit the same. Held: on ap- 1136. However, most jurisdictions
peal, affirmed. There is no princi- are in agreement with the theory
ple of law which bars a state from governing the case under discussion
prosecuting a criminal because the limiting the application of the Mccomplainant is a particeps criminis: Cord case to civil actions: People
People v. Hall (Cal. 1933) 23 P. v. Koscielniak (1930) 257 Ill. App.
(2d) 783.
514; State v. Wolf (1926) 168 Minn.
The defendant sought reversal on 505, 210 N. W. 589; People v. Watthe ground that "neither the law nor son (1889) 75 Mich. 582, 42 N. W.
public policy designs the protection
1005; Cunningham v. State (1897)
of rogues in their dealings with each 38 Atl. 847, 61 N. J. L. 67.
other, or to insure fair dealing and
Granting that the principle of the
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McCord case might have possessed
some utility in a less complicated
era when the presumption that
every man knows the law was indulged more completely, by warning criminals that the law would
not punish those who profited by
their folly, it would seem to have
been based upon a legal misconception from the first. The obvious
distinction between civil suits and
indictments for breaches of the criminal law was apparently overlooked.
The doctrine, applied properly in a
civil suit between rogues for contribution or reimbursement, has no
application in a criminal prosecution against one of several wrongdoers for a crime committed
against a fellow-criminal, or against
one whose hands
are soiled,
at least, by having been involved
in an illegal transaction connected
with the crime. The wrong is perpetrated against the peace of the
state. The prosecuting witness is

to be regarded as an instrument to
aid the state in punishing a wrongdoer against its laws, not as an individual seeking vengeance with the
state as an impartial referee.
More important than any purely
theoretical consideration, practical
necessity censures the rule. At a
time when every resource must be
utilized to keep the criminal at bay,
it would give him an unwarranted
protection by tying the hands of
the prosecution. It grants virtual
immunity to the confidence man
provided the scheme by which his
victim is fleeced involves the victim's own turpitude. It is a challenge to him to perfect a plan by
which the victim, perhaps a future
prosecuting witness, will be sufficiently besmirched to protect him.
Nothing could be more carefully designed to encourage the criminal
mind.
CLARKE J. MUNN, JR.

